By David L. Meeker, PhD, MBA
Vice President, Scientific Services, National Renderers Association
A few short years ago, few people were concerned about terrorism and even fewer about its impact on agriculture. Meetings on the topic were not well attended and studies were difficult to get funded. There was a bit of a stir in 1999 when it was revealed that the Soviet Union had 10,000 scientists working on bioterrorism right up to the collapse of their government, despite having signed the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention prohibiting development, production, and stockpiling, but few people worried about an attack on agriculture. Contrast that with September 2006 when 900 people gathered in Kansas City, MO, for a five-day conference sponsored by a number of government, industry, and academic institutions including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department of Homeland Security, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA).
The obvious change in terrorism concern came about after the attacks of September 11, 2001, but increasing attention is now being paid to possible attacks on agriculture. The mailed anthrax attacks of 2001 gave an agricultural look to terrorism, and then hand-written notes captured in an al-Qaeda cave in Afghanistan outlined how animal diseases could be used in agroterrorism. Add to that the media hype over avian influenza, public unease over genetic engineering, and recalls of vegetables because of E-coli contamination and we have heightened interest.
How Real is the Threat to Agriculture?
Health and Human Services Secretary Tommy Thompson said in his farewell speech, “For the life of me, I cannot understand why the terrorists have not attacked our food supply because it is so easy to do.” On the opposite end of the spectrum, critics think terrorism is simply a device to draw attention and maybe scare up some funding. There have been no actual known agroterrorism events in the United States to date, and only 12 globally since 1912. There was one U.S. attack on food in 1984 by the Rajneeshee group when they contaminated a restaurant salad bar with Salmonella Typhimurium in Oregon. Contrast that with 30 major terrorist attacks since September 11, 2001. Agriculture has not yet been a target while global unrest and terror has grown.
Animal diseases could be attractive agroterrorism agents because many would pose little handling risk – they are generally not harmful to humans. Little training would be required to prepare or administer an animal disease agent. Since animals are the primary vectors, no weaponization or genetic manipulation of a virus would be needed – a small amount of pathogen could have a high “terror yield.” Though not considered acts of agroterror, the classical swine fever outbreak in the Netherlands in 1997 and the foot and mouth outbreak in the United Kingdom in 2001 demonstrate the tremendous cost and human suffering that animal disease can cause. On the other hand, the exotic Newcastle disease in California in 2003 was handled well by the state of California and the USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service even though it was expensive, giving us hope that current systems of disease control will detect and contain an outbreak whether caused on purpose or by accident.
Four diseases from the World Organization for Animal Health, or OIE, “List A” are considered the top threats: foot and mouth disease and avian influenza because they are so common, and Nipah virus and Rift Valley fever because humans are very susceptible.
Possible targets for terrorism include humans, infrastructure, animals, food, and water. One reason why agriculture may be attractive as a target is the impact it could have on the economy. Agriculture is 9.7 percent of the U.S. gross domestic product, worth a total of $1 trillion. There are $50 billion in farm related exports each year. Attacks on agriculture could destabilize society and lower the confidence in government. Motivations behind such attacks besides terror could be revenge or profit. In addition, a devastating disease in farm animals could be accidentally spread by smugglers or tourists with similar results. Perpetrators could be Al Qaeda or radical activist groups. Companies should not rule out such attacks by disgruntled employees, market manipulators, or threats from those the FBI calls “village idiots” trying to extort money.
Will Rendering be a Target?
It’s not likely that rendering would be a primary direct target of agroterrorism. However, a hit to animal agriculture could make raw material unavailable, make raw material more available (at least short term in a disease outbreak), or depress markets for feed ingredients. Quarantines or stop movement orders could hinder operations for plants in or near a disease outbreak area, whether a result of criminal activity or naturally occurring.
Fortunately, existing programs in food safety, food defense, and foreign animal disease prevention all can stiffen our defenses against biological attacks. The concern about agroterrorism could strengthen funding for these programs and for research. As sectors throughout the food chain “harden” as targets, it’s important not to become the softest target by default or by ignoring the possibility.
What Should Renderers Do?
Most precautions are low cost. The FDA has developed an “ALERT” initiative to raise the awareness of state and local government agencies and industry representatives regarding food defense issues and preparedness. It identifies five key points that industry and businesses can use to decrease the risk of intentional contamination at their facility.
• ASSURE supplies and ingredients are from safe and secure sources.
• LOOK after the security of the products and ingredients in your facility.
• Know your EMPLOYEES and people coming in and out of your facility.
• Could you provide REPORTS about the security of your products?
• What do you do and who do you notify if you have a THREAT?
It’s very reassuring to know that many of these concepts are already included in the Animal Protein Producers Industry Rendering Code of Practice. Becoming certified in the code of practice will take a plant a long way toward hardening as a target, and it is good for business. Here are a few points in common with ALERT: monitor raw material, secure perimeter of plants, secure tanks and trucks, recall plans, and employee training (and screening).
In addition, renderers should be involved in emergency planning with their local and state authorities for both natural animal disease outbreaks and agroterrorism and how business can continue and restart after an emergency. Know local law enforcement including the FBI. If there is an incident, it would be good to already have a relationship with them. After a slow start, the Department of Homeland Security is operating much better than it did in response to the hurricanes of 2004. They are more open and cooperative with other agencies and industry, and they realize they still need much more understanding of agriculture. Each day, U.S. agriculture is better prepared in defense.
In summary, many sectors of agriculture are becoming more aware of possible threats from terrorism or natural animal disease outbreaks. While renderers may not be a primary target of attack, as a critical part of animal agriculture infrastructure we must also be informed and take some action to increase defenses. The Rendering Code of Practice already contains many of the recommendations that can decrease the risk from agroterrorism. With industry and government working together, we will all be better prepared to defend against deliberate or accidental animal disease or food contamination.
December 2006 Render